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OVERVIEW

The sort of cachet a Hollywood screenplay once ascribed to
"plastics" seems today to have adhered to "ADR." ADR stands,
of course, for alternative dispute resolution. It refers to various
methods by which neutral third parties assist persons engaged
in a conflict to settle their differences without invoking the decisionmaking power of the state. And for many people, ADR has
become the byword for a much-needed panacea for an overly
litigious society. This book is designed to get behind the mystique
of ADR, to show how it really works, and to enhance the skills of
anyone interested in exploiting its genuine potential for reducing
human discord.

*University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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IN GENERAL

ADR covers both mediation and arbitration. In mediation, 1
the neutral seeks to get the parties to agree on a mutually acceptable solution. In arbitration, the neutral imposes a solution after
presentations by the contending parties. In each instance the
procedure is a substitute for a more formal adversarial action
before a court or administrative agency. In many cases, however,
the mediator is a federal or state employee. Most arbitrators are
private persons, chosen by the parties themselves but often with
the aid of a public or private "designating agency." At their
best, mediation and arbitration have the advantages of speed,
cost savings, and informality over court or administrative
proceedings.
Mediation and arbitration in the context of collective bargaining between unions and employers have probably received
the most scholarly attention 2 and may be the most systematized.
The National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), despite its unqualified title, consists exclusively of persons who have established
themselves in the arbitration oflabor-management disputes. Yet
ADR has long extended to commercial disputes, construction
disputes, and even international disputes. Today it is an everexpanding field, covering disputes between employers and individual employees, professional athletes and their clubs and
agents, consumers and retailers, physicians and hospitals and
patients, landlords and tenants, husbands and wives and their
exes, environmentalists and alleged polluters, dog owners and
dog haters, and on and on. In the pages that follow, labor and
employment arbitration seems to be the center of gravity. But
most of the teachings of the nationally renowned band of mediators, arbitrators, and practitioners assembled by Editor Norman
Brand are readily transferable to the whole field of ADR.
Almost any Tom, Dick, or Mary can set themselves up as
mediators and arbitrators-or at least try. There is as yet no
major movement toward officially sanctioned certification procedures. So far both certification and mandatory training in ADR
1
A third term, "conciliation," is sometimes used and generally connotes
a milder form of intervention than mediation. A conciliator may simply get
the parties talking and do little to direct the course of their exchanges. A
mediator usually aims at a more structured dialogue.
2
The best sources of written material on the substance and procedure
of labor arbitration are the annual Proceedings of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, published by the Bureau of National Affairs.
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techniques have been successfully resisted on the grounds that
the savvy, experienced persons who employ ADR services will
know enough about the skills and integrity of the people they
retain to make informed selections. As mediation and arbitration
increasingly involve isolated individuals, however, the pressures
for certification and mandatory educational programs will inevitably rise. This is not likely to be an issue resolved on the basis
of a priori arguments. If the voluntary training offered by various
nonprofit and commercial organizations succeeds in preventing
an influx of incompetents into the field, the attractiveness of the
traditional free market and unlimited choice may prevail over
the calls for certification. But if there is a rash of scandalous
behavior by ill-trained or unscrupulous mediators and arbitrators, the cozy, self-regulated world of ADR that we have known,
unburdened by formal rules of entry, might well become a thing
of the past.

III.

MEDIATION

A typical mediator and a typical arbitrator may exhibit
rather different personality profiles, although many persons have
the capacity-some perhaps with reluctance, and with greater
or lesser degrees of success-to assume both roles. Not long
ago I was told about a stellar mediator who retired from his
government agency and was besieged by both unions and employers to take up arbitration. He did so and had a full docket almost
overnight. After only a few months, however, he quit arbitrating.
He explained tersely: "I love helping people come together. But
I hate trying to play God!" That exemplifies the empathetic,
accommodating, therapeutic style I associate with mediators,
while arbitrators in handling a case tend to be more impersonal
and decision-oriented.
The more important practical question is when, if at all, a
person should try to perform as both mediator and arbitrator
in the same proceeding. I am satisfied the answers will vary
considerably depending on the temperament of the arbitrator,
the chemistry existing between a given arbitrator and the disputants, and a subtle intuition of what the particular circumstances
permit or ordain. Everyone recognizes that there is one substantial risk: If mediation is attempted and fails, the would-be arbitrator may by then be privy to confidential disclosures from one
or both sides-the parties' "bottom line" for settlement, for example-that could be highly prejudicial when the arbitrator moves

4
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into a decisionmaking mode. Once one has been told about elephants, it is hard to put them out of mind. Yet the pragmatic
response is that mediation before arbitration often works, and
when it does, it saves all concerned much time, money, and
psychic wear and tear. That has led to the process known as
"med-arb."
Some arbitrators take a middle course and invariably give
the parties one last chance to settle on their own before opening
the hearing. That does not necessarily require any further intervention by the neutral at all. One arbitrator told me this stratagem succeeds for him more often than not. I am of the old school
that believes if the parties have engaged someone as an arbitrator, they ordinarily want an arbitrator, not a mediator. In more
than 30 years of arbitrating, I have rarely attempted any preliminary mediating, except at the joint instigation of the parties.
Even then I was careful to warn them about the "elephant phenomenon" and the inhibitions I might feel in probing too deeply
into confidential matters on either side.
The procedures in both mediation and arbitration are likely
to vary considerably, depending on the personal style of the
neutral. That is especially true of mediation, which by its very
nature is the more informal of the two processes. For example,
one of the eminent mediators who explains his approach in this
volume emphasizes that he makes it a point to address himself
primarily to the parties themselves and not to their representatives. Yet a second eminent mediator says no such thing, even
though she stresses the value ofletting clients on occasion speak
for themselves. I gather that this mediator would tend to deal
with the parties through their attorneys or representatives, as
is also usually the case in arbitration.
Various classifications have been devised for analyzing different approaches to mediation. These are not watertight categories, and the same mediator may shift from one type to another,
even in the same proceeding. But one classification scheme I
have found helpful is the following, listed in ascending order of
intervention by the neutral:

• Transformative or collaborative mediation. The focus here
is on the state of the parties' relationship. The mediator
does not so much try to lead as to get the parties to discover
their own separate and mutual resources and to understand the other party's point of view. This is a good starting
point from which to move on, if necessary, to other forms
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of mediation. It is not easy, however, to shift back to transformative mediation from a more active type.
• Evaluative mediation. Here the mediator does not attempt
to come up with a specific solution but concentrates on
showing the respective strengths and weaknesses of each
party's position. Mediators using this technique may begin
by holding separate meetings with the parties in an effort
to fully understand their points of view. Thereafter, especially if the parties have had a longstanding relationship,
the effort will generally be to keep them together as much
as possible, talking and listening to the mediator and to
each other.
• Directive or result-oriented mediation. Here, quite deliberately, the aim is to bring the parties to a certain goal that
the mediator, at some point in the process, has concluded
is appropriate and achievable. Some mediators employing
this approach will sit down with both parties and let them
talk to the mediator, not to each other, with the more
agitated going first. Yet each party hears the other's story
with the fervor behind it. The ground rules will forbid
personal attacks by the speaker or interruptions by the
listener. Even so, caucuses may be required from time to
time to cool tempers, to permit confidential communications to the mediator, and to move the negotiations along
toward closure. Other mediators will spend the bulk of
their time meeting separately with the opposing parties.
Transcending all these questions of technique is a very simple human factor that constitutes a key ingredient of success in
mediation: the trust and confidence the parties come to repose
in the neutral third party. Whatever their stylistic differences
may be, the mediators contributing to this volume agree on that.
And for me that reflects the principal glory of the mediation
process. Other aspects of dispute resolution, both traditional and
alternative, may be more intellectually challenging and philosophically oriented. But in mediation the emphasis is on the
total input of all three participants-the claimant, the respondent, and the neutral-in working together to reach a solution
that is mutually acceptable to the contending parties. The result
may lack the coherence and elegance of a finely reasoned judicial
or arbitral opinion. Yet the mediation product is a joint, voluntary
creation, and its frequent rough edges bear testimony to its
source in multiple human hands. Even as mediators may wince
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at the imperfections of the final settlement, they can take pride
in the knowledge that the trust and confidence they generated
led two opposing camps to find their own common ground, without the fiat of some external force. 3

IV.

ARBITRATION

The virtues of arbitration are different from those of mediation.4 The respective parties or their representatives may carefully prepare and present their case. They may make eloquent
closing arguments or file persuasive posthearing briefs. But in
the end, it comes down to the judgment of the arbitrator, usually
one individual or the impartial chair of a tripartite panel. Generally, of course, arbitration shares with mediation an element of
voluntariness. The parties have agreed, either before the dispute
or after it has arisen, to use this device as an alternative to
litigation or self-help such as a strike or work stoppage. They
have also agreed on the arbitrator or on the manner of choosing
that person. In addition, they can agree, but seldom do, on various
procedural details for the conduct of the arbitration. Yet once
the proceedings are under way, the arbitrator is largely in charge.
Lacking are much of the informality and nearly all the sense of
a voice in decisionmaking that characterize mediation.
For certain intractable disputes, however, mediation would
be futile and arbitration is the only viable recourse short of"going
to law." The intractability may be a matter of ideology, economics,
institutional politics, personality, or whatever, but that need not
detain us. The demand is for an imposed solution, which the
parties must accept whether they like it or not. Nonetheless,
arbitration still shines in letting determined combatants meet
in an arena that is less intimidating, less rule-driven, and less
likely to disrupt ongoing relationships than a courtroom or an
administrative agency. And if administered intelligently, arbi-

3

One of the best general treatments of mediation is WILLIAM E. SIMKIN &
NICHOLAS A. FIDANDIS, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(BNA Books 2d ed. 1986).
4
Standard works on arbitration include ELKOURI & ELKOURI: How ARBITRATION WoRKS (Marlin Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., BNA Books 5th ed. 1997
& 1999 Supp.); THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS
(Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., BNA Books 1998); ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE
(Arnold M. Zack ed., 1984); LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRACTICAL GurnE FOR ADvoCATES (Max Zimny et al. eds., BNA Books 1990); and DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
IN ARBITRATION (Norman Brand ed., BNA Books 1999 & 2001 Supp.).
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tration can also be gentler on the parties' pocketbooks, time
sheets, and psyches.
The biblical King Solomon is often cited as the first arbitrator. In deciding between the two women claiming the one surviving infant, Solomon relied much more on his assessment of maternal instincts than on technical niceties like rules of evidence and
burden of proof. It almost seems as if arguments have raged ever
since about whether creeping legalism would be the ruination
of arbitration. In the labor field, the divergent philosophies were
reflected in the clash of two pioneering titans. On the one hand,
George Taylor expounded the view that labor arbitration was
an extension of collective bargaining. It followed that hearings
should be relaxed and informal, and the parties' needs and purposes should count as much as the literal wording of their agreements. On the other hand, Noble Braden of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) treated labor arbitration as a substitute
for litigation. The courts' procedures and substantive principles
were thus his touchstone. The parties and their representatives
came to prefer the predictability and autonomy afforded them
by the Braden model-which allowed arbitrators considerably
less discretion than Taylor's model-and Braden ultimately prevailed, especially on the standards for contract interpretation. 5
Nevertheless, the battles continue about the conduct of the
hearing, the rules of evidence, the burden and standard of proof,
and the like. The differences may be more apparent than real.
For example, while some arbitrators say they do not apply the
rules of evidence as such, they still tend to follow the underlying
principles, consciously or otherwise. Most will accept certain
forms of hearsay, such as the physician's routine certification of
the illness of an absent employee, but they will ordinarily not
sustain a discharge wholly on the basis of hearsay. Arbitrators
recognize the importance of cross-examination and will discount
even admissible hearsay accordingly. On the burden of proof,
there are respected arbitrators who insist it is a meaningless
concept; they feel they eventually have to decide which party is
more convincing. Once in a great while, however, I find I cannot
reach that conclusion-the evidence is in equilibrium. It is then

5
The Taylor-Braden debate and its outcome are recounted in Richard
Mittenthal, Whither Arbitration? in ARBITRATION 1991: THE CHANGING FACE OF
ARBITRATION IN THEORY & PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 44TH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 35 (Gladys Gruenberg ed., BNA Books
1992).
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that burden of proof comes into play, and the party bearing it
loses. There are similar variations in arbitrators' attitudes about
the standard of proof, especially in discharge cases. Is it a simple
preponderance of the evidence, or something more? If the latter,
what is it?
Another example appears in an article in this volume. One
of the country's premier arbitrators declares that he will not
provide a full-fledged opinion with an award in the absence of
a transcript. This approach is supported on the ground that
arbitration is usually the final resolution of a dispute and so it
is doubly important to "get it right" the first time. Yet other
arbitrators would insist that this effort at perfection may come
at too high a cost, in terms of both time and money. Arbitration
was designed to secure reasonably fair results without great
outlays. Except in quite complicated cases, no need is said to
exist for the whole cumbersome apparatus of transcripts, discovery, and briefs that we associate with court trials. Who is right?
Several comments seem apropos of these-and numerous
other-persisting problems in the arbitration procedure. A few
years ago, there was a proposal within the NAA to draft a "restatement" of arbitral principles developed over the past half
century, akin to the Restatements of the Law produced by the
American Law Institute. The idea was rejected. The Academy
membership opposed the notion that there was one right set of
answers to the many questions on which arbitrators differed. In
any event, parties were entitled to the personal judgment of the
individual arbitrator they had chosen and should not be subjected
to the collective rulings of a faceless group. Some opponents
feared that any such restatement might become a vade mecum,
a handy reference work to solve all problems, without the irksome
task of grubbing for the specifics of particular facts and particular contracts.
The upshot of these deliberations was a compromise. An
effort would be made to sum up in brief compass some of the
major principles enunciated by labor arbitrators during the first
50 years of the NAA. But where reputable arbitrators took differing positions, those divisions would be recognized. There would
be no attempt at a definitive resolution of the conflicts. This
compromise reflected much wisdom about the nature of arbitration and ADR in general. Like any other developing institution,
it can profit greatly from the cumulative experience of the past.
At the same time, an evolving field can always expect further
refinements and shifts of direction in light of new data and unforeseen events.
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ADR

What is the future of ADR? If I guess right, it will not be
as tidy or autonomous a world as the one we have known. ADR
is shooting out in all directions, assuming many new forms and
embracing much new subject matter. To the dismay of numerous
past champions, ADR will lose much of its formerly private character. That can happen in a couple of different ways. First, courts
and administrative agencies, facing a rising tide of litigation,
will increasingly refer cases out for mediation or arbitration. A
number of states have already provided for "mandatory mediation" or "advisory arbitration" before trial in almost any civil
action for damages. In one format, a panel of three lawyers drawn
from the plaintiffs' bar, the defendants' bar, and a nonspecialists'
bar listens to a half-hour presentation of the case by the parties'
attorneys, with little or no evidence being offered. The panel
arrives at a recommended settlement figure in another 10 or 20
minutes. No one is bound by the result. But if one party accepts
it and the other declines, the holdout must better the recommendation by 10 percent at trial or else be liable for all the
other party's attorney's fees incurred after the date of the ADR
proceedings.
Another way in which ADR procedures can become less private and more public is through the parties' own agreements.
They may provide that all disputes between them arising out
of an employment relationship, a consumer transaction, or a
hospitalization will be subject to final and binding arbitration
rather than court action. The claims involved may be statutory
as well as contractual, for example, the rights of employees under
civil rights statutes not to be discriminated against because of
race, sex, age, disability, and so on, or the rights of consumers
to truth in lending.
A red flag immediately goes up, however, if the party in the
stronger bargaining position, such as an employer, imposes socalled "mandatory arbitration" as a condition of employment,
and the coverage includes claims of discrimination in violation
of applicable federal or state statutes. On its face, that amounts
to a blatant affront to the public policy of letting employees (or
individual consumers) place such claims before a judge and jury.
Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has approved these mandatory arbitration arrangements for individual employees. 6 And there are
6
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 55 FEP Cases
1116 (1991). Cf Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 84 FEP
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several studies indicating that employees actually succeed more
often in pursuing discrimination claims in employer-established
arbitration systems than in the courts (although winners in court
win bigger).7 It may well be that, as a practical matter, the
concern should be more with ensuring employees and other individuals due process safeguards in mandated arbitrations 8 than
with theoretical objections to the compulsory nature of the process. In any event, we can be confident that the courts will be
taking a closer look at the way arbitrators apply the law in
these statutory cases than is true when courts are reviewing
arbitrators' awards in disputes over collective bargaining agreements or other private contracts. When statutory rights are at
stake, arbitrators should write their decisions defensively and
with deliberation, just as if a federal judge were looking over
their shoulder, scrutinizing their every word.
That does not mean that a court should review an arbitral
award dealing with a statutory issue in the same way an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision. The parties have agreed
that the arbitrator's award shall be "final and binding." As between parties of equivalent bargaining power-General Motors
and U.S. Steel, even General Motors and the United Auto Workers-and especially in the absence of sensitive civil rights' issues,
an agreement to submit statutory claims to arbitral resolution
should be treated much like an agreement to submit contractual
claims. Although the decisions are somewhat divided, there is
clear judicial authority that arbitrators may be the final judges
of law as well as fact, and that awards based on a misconception
of the law will be upheld. 9 Technically, as I would analyze it, the
arbitrators in such instances are still rendering a contractual
ruling rather than a statutory one; they are applying not the
statute directly, but the parties' agreement to be bound by the
arbitrator's determination.
Certain distinctions must be recognized. As the Supreme
Court has held, some statutory rights, such as those under the

Cases 769 (2000) (mobile home financing agreement). See also Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 85 FEP Cases 266 (2001).
7
See, e.g., Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and
Civil Rights, 30 CoLUM. HUMAN RTs. L. REV. 31, 46-50 (1998); and infra Chapter 51.
8
See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 72 FEP Cases
1775 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
9
See Annot., 112 A.L.R. 873 (1938); George Day Constr. Co. v. Carpenters
Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471, 1477, 115 LRRM 2459 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), "devolve on employees as individual workers, not as members of a collective organization" and
are "not waivable" by the employees' union. 10 In those situations
the courts will not defer to the arbitrator's erroneous denial of
employee rights. Similarly, if an arbitrator's interpretation of an
Occupational Safety and Health Act requirement ignores applicable legal precedent and does not adequately protect the employees, a court would not be bound by it. But if an arbitrator imposes
more stringent requirements than the statute, I would say that
the award should be enforced. The parties agreed to abide by
that result, and their agreement should be accorded the same
finality as any other arbitration contract.
A middle position may be taken when workers' collective
statutory rights are in dispute. An example would be the right
of employees under the National Labor Relations Act not to be
discriminated against because of union activity. There the National Labor Relations Board and the courts will honor the arbitrator's award so long as it is not "palpably wrong" and "clearly
repugnant" to the Act. 11 That ought to be a loose enough rein to
let most arbitral awards pass review.
The greatest potential for the expansion of employment arbitration lies in the nonunion workplace. With the steep decline
in private sector union membership, from over 35 percent half
a century ago to less than 10 percent today, the vast majority
of American workers are subject to employment at will. They
can be fired for any reason, arbitrary or otherwise, so long as it
does not violate a specific statute or a basic public policy. The
United States is the last major industrial democracy in the world
that countenances such a doctrine. Changes could come through
contracts, statutes, or unilaterally adopted employer programs.
During the 1980s the courts of most states engrafted limited
exceptions onto at-will employment. Employer assurances (oral
or via employee handbooks) of continued employment were often
treated as binding contracts. But employers could simply refrain
from such assurances or rescind them with adequate notice. In
1991, the Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) adopted the Model
Employment Termination Act, under which most employees with
10

Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745, 24 WH
Cases 1284 (1981) (FLSA). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 7 FEP Cases 81 (1974) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
11
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 1082, 36 LRRM 1152 (1955); Olin
Corp., 268 NLRB 573, 115 LRRM 1056 (1984); Hammontree v. NLRB, 925
F.2d 1486, 136 LRRM 2478 (1991) (en bane).
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more than one year of service would be protected against discharge without "good cause." The preferred method of enforcement would be through private arbitrators. Despite the high
prestige of the ULC, however, no state has thus far adopted
this proposed legislation. If good cause for dismissal became a
national standard and arbitration the principal forum, I calculate
there would be at least 30,000 awards per year in discharge cases
in the private sector. I base that projection on the estimated
25,000 annual labor arbitrations in the mid 1990s, of which
10,000 involved discipline, including suspensions.
The most immediate sources of growth in employment arbitration are the relatively new employer-promulgated plans. One
estimate is that mandatory plans now cover around 16 million
employees-about the number covered by collective bargaining
agreements. Many employers are willing to arbitrate more total
cases to avoid the costs and large jury verdicts they encounter
in court. In addition, numerous retailers, utilities, insurers, lenders, medical caregivers, and other providers have analogous
agreements with customers, insureds, debtors, patients, and assorted consumers of goods and services. These are typically contracts of adhesion, and the courts should be quick to strike down
those that are too "one-sided" in favor of the party imposing
them. 12
Regardless of that, and regardless of the superior record of
claimants in arbitration compared to those in court litigation,
opponents of mandatory arbitration are now carrying the battle
to Congress. More than a dozen bills have been introduced to
limit ADR, most of which would prohibit predispute agreements
to arbitrate. Predispute agreements are concededly less "knowing
and voluntary" than postdispute agreements. In the latter instance, the triggering event has occurred, and what is at stake
is much more obvious-the parties can make a more informed
and freer judgment about how to proceed. But postdispute agreements, although theoretically ideal, are unlikely to be acceptable
to either employers or employees, and perhaps to several other
classes of disputants. Employers will not arbitrate with employees with small claims, knowing they are unlikely to find a lawyer
willing to spend the time and money to take their case to court.
Conversely, employees with large claims and with lawyers

12
See, e.g., Hooters of Arn., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938, 79 FEP
Cases 629 (4th Cir. 1999); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Servs.,
24 Cal. 4th 83, 6 P.3d 669, 83 FEP Cases 1172 (2000).
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operating on a contingent fee basis will usually be eager to get
before a judge and jury. The choice would thus seem to be predispute agreements to arbitrate employment disputes (and other
kinds of disputes as well) or few if any arbitration agreements
at all.
Those who object on principle to mandatory arbitration are
more willing to accept mandatory mediation-that is, an agreement "imposed" on employees, customers, or patients not to sue
until they have exhausted internal procedures whereby a neutral
third party tries to secure a voluntary settlement. In such situations, of course, the "weaker" party can always withhold consent
to the proposed resolution. This has added impetus to the movement for mediation in all types of disputes. Academics, practitioners, and organizations interested in mediation have formed
the Alliance for Education in Dispute Resolution to promote the
process. The AAA has renamed its venerable Arbitration Journal
the Journal of Dispute Resolution, and many articles on mediation now appear in its pages. And a Cornell study has reported
a crass sign of the times: mediation now commands higher daily
fees for the neutral than does arbitration. 13

VI.

CONCLUSION

The past decade has been a boom time for ADR. Besides the
developments already discussed, the evidence ranges all the way
from the Supreme Court's sharp limiting of the most common
grounds for seeking vacatur of a labor arbitration award-the
"public policy" objection14-to the AAA opening its first office
in Europe, the International Center for Dispute ResolutionDublin. 15 With California in the lead, the country has also seen
a rash of"intermediation" and "rent-a-judge" services to compete
with the more traditional designating agencies. Some of these
for-profit operations must be eyed with concern. Excessive fees
and other unsavory practices could, if left unchecked, taint the
whole arbitration and mediation profession.
13
Michel Picher, Ronald L. Seeber, & David B. Lipsky, The Arbitration
Profession in Transition, in ARBITRATION 2000: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND EFFI-

CIENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 267, 299 (Steven Briggs & Jay E. Grenig
eds., 2001).
14
Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers (UMW) Dist. 17, 531 U.S.
57, 165 LRRM 2865 (2000).
15
56 DrsP. RESOL. J. 6 (May-July 2001).
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On balance, however, I am optimistic about the future of
ADR. Any abuses will be remedied, if not by self-regulation, then
by public intervention. Whatever may be its shortcomings, the
sturdy virtues of ADR still remain. Properly administered, it
does not entail the cost, time, or trauma of a court suit. Beyond
that, ADR exhibits one supreme attribute: it maximizes the
involvement of the disputing parties. This is preeminently true
of mediation, of course, where nothing is final until the parties
themselves say so. Yet even in arbitration they have a major
voice. Typically they can select the arbitrator, frame the issue,
define the remedies, and even spell out procedural details. Participation is the essence of ADR. And the resolution of any dispute
is most likely to be accepted and lasting when the contending
parties have had a hand in its fashioning.

